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ABSTRACT
TWO FACTOR AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHORIZATION
IN UBIQUITOUS MOBILE COMPUTING
by
Qing Zhu

Handheld devices, such as mobile phones, PDAs and others, have become an integrated
part of our lives. They are perfectly suitable to become the first real-life platforms for
mobile computing applications. A lightweight holistic authentication and authorization
scheme is presented for this typical wireless scenario. It is shown that either SIM or
Kerberos authentication has its limitations. A two-factor authentication method
SIM-based Kerberos authentication is developed to implement the Secure Single Sign-on
function with LDAP protocol realization for authorization and mobile directory services.
Performance analysis and power consumption analyses for this protocol are presented as
well. Our results show that our SIM-Based Kerberos authentication is significantly
optimized to be suitable for mobile platforms.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Motivation
The computing power of mobile devices increases year-by-year. A natural trend is that
more and more resource intensive services are accessed through these devices because of
the inherent advantages, and conveniences offered by portable devices. In line with these
changes, mobile devices such as mobile phones and PDAs turn into versatile all-in-one
personal service managers: They can be used for accessing contents, services, and
applications provided via the Internet, storing personal information, important data, etc.
At the New Jersey Institute of Technology, we are creating the SmartCampus
Test-Bed, a large scale mobile, wireless campus community system with a number of
mobile, locatable, online community system applications.
Many users are reluctant to use applications that send sensitive data over wireless
connections because they don't trust wireless security. Therefore, it is very important to
ensure strict access control to the transaction data between clients and servers.
Solutions are emerging. The same protocol that makes secure traditional wired
networks possible can also help make wireless transactions safe. The only one which is
providing Single Sign-On and light weight protocol is Kerberos.
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1.2 Thesis Statement
The goal of this thesis is to introduce research on lightweight, cross-platform single
sign-on authentication architectures to bring mobile networks in lione with WLAN
networks. We design, implement, and analyze the SIM-Based Kerberos protocol for new
cellphones with mobile and WLAN capability.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss the
background of the SmartCampus project, single sign-on authentication and related works.
In Chapter 3, we introduce the Kerberos Protocol and its implementation on the phone. In
Chapter 4, we introduce mobile security and SIM-based authentication. In Chapter 5, we
present the design and implementation of the SIM-based Kerberos protocol on the phone.
In Chapter 7, we introduce the LDAP protocol, directory services and authorization for
the SmartCampus middleware. In Chapter 8, we evaluate the performance and power
consumption of our authentication architecture.

CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND

2.1 SmartCampus Project
SmartCampus is an ongoing project at the New Jersey Institute of Technology. At the
New Jersey Institute of Technology we are creating the SmartCampus Test-Bed, a large
scale mobile network which may include hundreds to thousands of users in a wireless
campus community system that will serve as a dispersed living laboratory for the study of
location-aware community systems using People-To-People-To-Places Services. The
completion of the project would help us enhance services as the following in the campus
community: e.g., NJIT students would be able to communicate with other students having
similar interests, taking similar classes, to build social networks etc. So with the
SmartCampus project we could use a range of technologies to locate individuals as they
go about their daily activities. The availability of such technologies enables a new class of
location aware information systems that link people to people to geographical places. It
can strengthen the relationship between social networks and physical places. They can
also help individuals collect location information to make new social ties and interact with
existing ties. The main tool that is going to help us with this project would be the smart
cell phone. It would contain an implementation of the campus mesh program.
A much clearer example for the SmartCampus project would be one where a
student wants to play online computer game. Our Campus Mesh program on his smart
campus cell phone he sends out a message asking for people to play with him together.
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Then someone with a similar interest in the computer game will match the request and get
his message. Now both could exchange messages and then play together online.
So the SmartCampus initiative features the development of software that, permits
access to a database of individual user interests and daily routines for all participants to
facilitate social interactions. Constructing this database of participant profiles involves
collecting data from mobile communication devices never attempted before. These
profiles will be leveraged in real time to support activities that will make life richer for all.
Mobile applications often interact with multiple backend servers, pull information from
them as needed, and assemble personalized displays for users. Each information service
provider might have its own user authentication and authorization protocols. It is a major
inconvenience for mobile users to sign on to each backend server manually.

2.2 Single Sign-on Authentication
For example, our project runs many coexisting Java applications, each requiring
authentication in order to access enterprise resources. It is best to implement single
sign-on (SSO) security functionality to make authentication less intrusive for your users.
Fundamentally, single sign-on authentication means the sharing of authentication
data. For instance, many students might need to access campus resources (database tables,
for example) in order to fulfill their requirements, with different students requiring
different resources depending on their function. Obviously, we need an authentication
mechanism in place that can determine who is trying to access a particular resource. Once
the authentication module knows the identity of the student, an authorization module
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within the implementation can check whether the authenticated user has the necessary
privileges to access the resource. Let's suppose that students use their usernames and
passwords for authentication. The authentication module would thus have a database of
usernames and passwords. Each incoming request for authentication would be
accompanied by a username-password pair, which the authentication module would
compare against the pairs in its internal database.
Our SmartCampus project may have several applications running within its scope.
Different applications may form different modules of the same project. Each application
is complete in itself, which means that it has its own user base, as well as several different
tiers, including the back-end database, middleware, and a GUI for its users.
Before, usually people duplicate the authentication process to enable the
cross-application authentication. For example, people duplicate the username and
password databases on every application. This also means that the user will authenticate
separately on different applications -- in other words, she will enter her username and
password while accessing each of the applications, and the application will perform all the
authentication steps again. In this way, the disadvantage is not only duplicating the
username and password database but also duplicating the authentication process overhead.
The amount of redundancy should be very obvious especially in the resource restricted
mobile application.
One way to combat this problem is through the use of single sign-on service which
is sharing authentication data between different applications. If a user is authenticated at
one application, her authentication information is transferred to the second. The second
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application accepts the authentication information without going through all the
authentication steps. There is no redundancy in this solution. The only requirement is that
the two applications trust each other so that each application accepts authentication data
coming from the other. The advantage to using SSO is that users only need to remember
one login name and password. They are less likely to complain about the necessity of it
being complex or feel the need to write it down.
Normally, SSO is implemented as a separate authentication server. All
applications that need to authenticate users rely on the SSO-based authentication server to
check the identity of their users. Single sign-on servers manage user profiles and provide
time-stamped access tokens, such as Kerberos tickets, to authenticated users. Service
providers interact with single sign-on servers to validate tokens. Based on this
authentication information, different applications then enforce their own authorization
policies.

2.3 Related Work
In this section, I will discuss the related work in the area of authentication. Authentication
is so important that many authentication solutions have been published, but at a later time
weaknesses and disadvantage were discovered in them. For examples,

PKI
A Public Key Infrastructure (PM) is the key management environment for public
key information of a public key cryptographic system. In general, there are three basic
PM architectures based on the number of Certificate Authorities (CAs) in the PM, where
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users of the PKI place their trust (known as a user's trust point), and the trust relationships
between CAs within a multi-CA PKI. The most basic PKI architecture is one that contains
a single CA that provides the PKI services (certificates, certificate status information, etc.)
for all the users of the PKI.
Multiple CA PKIs can be constructed using one of two architectures based on the
trust relationship between the CAs. A PKI constructed with superior-subordinate CA
relationships is called a hierarchical PKI architecture. Alternatively, a PKI constructed of
peer-to-peer CA relationships is called mesh PKI architecture.

PKINIT
PKINIT is an extension of the Kerberos protocol (RFC1510), which enables use of
public key cryptography for client authentication. The PKINIT mechanism hasn't been
standardized yet and the specification is still under development directed by the IETF
Kerberos WG. Implementation of the PKINIT mechanism is intended for the Heimdal
open source implementation of Kerberos V5. It is based on the latest draft of the PKINIT
specification and was created for Heimdal v.0.5 . Please remember the implementation
published here is still under development and not intended for use in production
environments.

EAP SIM
-

Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for GSM Subscriber Identity, or
EAP-SIM, is an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) mechanism for authentication
and session key distribution using the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM)
Subscriber Identity Module (SIM). EAP-SIM is described in RFC 4186. Extensible
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Authentication Protocol (EAP) mechanism is used for authentication and session key
distribution using the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) Subscriber
Identity Module (SIM). GSM is a second generation mobile network standard. The
EAP-SIM mechanism specifies enhancements to GSM authentication and key agreement
whereby multiple authentication triplets can be combined to create authentication
responses and session keys of greater strength than the individual GSM triplets. The
mechanism also includes network authentication, user anonymity support, result
indications, and a fast re-authentication procedure.

CHAPTER 3
KERBEROS

3.1 Introduction
Kerberos authentication provides a mechanism for mutual authentication between a client
and a server on an open insecure network. Kerberos the name came from Greek
mythology in which it is the three-headed dog that guarded the entrance to Hades (or the
world of dead). The name seems very appropriate as this is an Authentication mechanism
first of all and by design has 3 main parts which are explained later.
Kerberos uses as its basis the Needham-Schroeder protocol. It makes use of a
trusted third party, termed a Key Distribution Center (KDC), which consists of two
logically separate parts: an Authentication Server (AS) and a Ticket Granting Server
(TGS). Kerberos works on the basis of "tickets" which serve to prove the identity of users.
The KDC maintains a database of secret keys; each entity on the network, whether a client
or a server, shares a secret key known only to itself and to the KDC. Knowledge of this
key serves to prove an entity's identity. For communication between two entities, the
KDC generates a session key which they can use to secure their interactions.

Figure 3.1 Kerberos authentication
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3.2 Physical Architecture
The 3 main parts of the Kerberos Physical infrastructure are: Key Distribution Centre
(KDC), Client User, and Server with the desired service to access.
3.2.1 KDC
KDC (Key Distribution Server) is the heart of the complete Kerberos infrastructure. KDC
is the central piece which implements the concept of Mediated Authentication.
As shown above KDC shares keys with all other components, users or services.
All these are called nodes in the KDC realm. Now if a wants to talk to b, it will send a
request to the KDC which shares keys with both a and b. KDC will authenticate a and
choose a random number Rab which will be used as key between a and b. Then it will
encrypt Rab with the key that KDC shares with a and send this to a and similarly it will
encrypt Rab with the key that it shares with b and send it to b. By this exchange both a
and b now it have the key Rab that they will use for secure communication later between
them.
This is the simplest form of key exchange that KDC performs; along with the
Random number there a number of other things that KDC includes along with the
encrypted random number and this whole package are called a ticket. Various other things
like timestamp, expiry time etc are added to make the communication more secure and
robust against various replay attacks. The exchange explained above is shown in the
diagram below:
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Figure 3.2 Basic Key Exchange using a KDC

Now this exchange has a lot of issue:
•

If a immediately sends a message to b bases on the shared key, b may or may not
have received the key by then it will not know how to decrypt this message.

•

In this case as a is going to talk to b then it is unnecessary for KDC to talk to b as
it is not going to communicate to b anyways after this exchange. So a lot of
resources are wasted in setting up a secure session between KDC and b just for
this one time.
Kerberos uses a different approach in dealing with the issue of exchanging keys.

This is mainly based on the Needham-Schroeder exchange.
Needham Schroeder Protocol
-

In case of Needham-Schroeder Protocol the KDC has the Public Keys for all the nodes.
So this becomes the source of public keys and being a trusted third party it prevents the
impersonation attacks that may happen in case we get the public key of any service for a
non trusted source. The basic working of this protocol is as shown below:
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Figure 3.3 Needham-Schroeder Protocol

Step1: Alice sends Bob a message that she wants to talk to him
Step2: Bob selects a nonce N and encrypts it using his Key K BBob that it shares
with the KDC
Step3: Alice sends a message to KDC the message includes a nonce N 1, Request
to talk to Bob and the message Bob sent to Alice in step 2
Step4: KDC checks K

{N } and if valid sends a message to BobAlice encrypted

with KAlice that KDC shares with Alice. The message includes a nonce N 1 , "Bob", KAB
and a ticket to Bob which is nothing but using Bob's key encrypted information K AB ,
"Alice" and nonce N that was sent by Bob to Alice in the first place. This ticket will be
used in the next step to authenticate Alice to Bob.
Step5: Alice sends a message to Bob that includes the ticket given by the KDC in
the previous step and a nonce N2 encrypted using the shared key K AB

13

Step6: Bob sends a message to Alice, in which it encrypts using the shared key
KAB , 2 -1 and another nonce N3
Step7: Alice sends Bob the nonce N3 - 1 encrypted using K AB . The last 2
exchanges are used for mutual authentication by Bob and Alice.

This protocol is secure against the replay attacks in case any attacker intercepts
some of the messages, they cannot be used for creating any new sessions.
NOTE: This protocol can be reduced from 7 to 6 messages in case Alice in step 6
sends another message i.e. KAB { KBob {NB}}. By this there is no need to send the last
message i.e. Step 7 as Bob already authenticates Alice in step 5 only.
There are several other ways in which the mediated authentication via a KDC can
be implemented like Otway-Rees, Bellovin-Merritt etc.
The main advantage of using a KDC is that it makes the key distribution much
easier. If any node wants to join the network we just need to setup a Key between the
node and the KDC and in case some node is suspected of being compromised the setup
again needs to change a just one place. The alternative of KDC will be for nodes to share
keys between themselves depending on what service they may need access to.
Although the KDC mediated authentication has its advantages, it has its own
disadvantages as well. The KDC has enough information to impersonate any one on the
network so if it is compromised all the network resources are open to attack.
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KDC is the single point of failure. If it goes down nobody can access anything.
This can be dealt with by having High availability (HA) KDC as is done practically, but
that adds to the complexity of the already complex system.
The KDC can become a bottleneck as far as performance is considered because
everyone frequently needs to talk to it. Having multiple KDC's can alleviate this problem,
but then again the complexity may be an issue.
Moving the concept of KDC a bit further now we will look at the HDC structure
as it exists in most practical Kerberos implementations: KDC is divided into 2 parts based
on functionality. Each part provides services to the other part. The 2 parts are the
Authentication Server (AS) and Ticket Granting Server (TGS).

Authentication Server (AS)
The AS issues TGTs good for admission to the ticket-granting service in its domain.
Before network client's can get tickets for services, each client must get an initial TGT
from the authentication service in the user's account domain.

Ticket granting service (TGS)
-

The TGS issues tickets good for admission to other services in the TGS's domain or to the
ticket-granting service of a trusted domain. When a client wants access to a service, it
must contact the ticket-granting service in the service's account domain, present a TGT,
and ask for a ticket. If the client does not have a TGT valid for admission to that
ticket-granting service, it must get one through a referral process that begins at the
ticket-granting service in the user account's domain and ends at the ticket-granting service
in the service account's domain.
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3.2.2 Client User
Before explaining what a Kerberos client is we need to know principal. All entities within
Kerberos, including users, computers, and services, are known as principals. Principal
names are unique; a hierarchical naming structure ensures their uniqueness. Most KDC
implementations store the principals in a database, so you may hear the term "Kerberos
database" applied to the KDC.
"Kerberos client" is any entity that gets a service ticket for a Kerberos service. A
client is typically a user, but any principal can be a client (unless for some reason the
administrator has explicitly forbidden this principal to be a client). In the KDC
explanation Alice is a client user.
3.2.3 Server with the desired service
All users use the Kerberos tickets to access services that are located usually on a remote
server. This server needs to be a trusted one and be a part of the Kerberos realm.

3.3 Kerberos Logical Infrastructure
This section introduces the logical infrastructure, the key structure, the ticket types.
The various Physical components of Kerberos contain a number of logical
attributes which are of prime importance for Kerberos to work.
The Kerberos protocol relies heavily on an authentication technique involving
shared-secret keys. The basic shared-secret concept is quite simple: If a secret is known
by only two people, then either person can verify the identity of the other by confirming
that the other person knows the secret. For example, as explained in the
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Needham-Schroeder protocol in the earlier session, suppose that Alice often sends
messages to Bob, and that Bob needs to ensure that a message from Alice really has come
from Alice before he acts on its information. They decide to solve their problem by
selecting a password and agreeing to share the secret password between the two of them,
but not with anyone else. If a message purported to be from Alice can somehow
demonstrate that the sender knows the password, Bob can verify that the sender is indeed
Alice.
The only question left for Alice and Bob to resolve is how Alice will show that
she knows the password. She could include it somewhere in her messages, perhaps in a
signature block at the end — Alice, Our secret. This would be simple and efficient and
would be effective if Alice and Bob could be sure that no one else is reading their mail.
Unfortunately, their messages pass over a network used by people like Carol, who uses a
network analyzer to scan traffic in hope that one day she might spot a password. Thus,
Alice must not prove that she knows the secret by including it in her message. To keep the
password secret, she must show that she knows it without revealing it.
The Kerberos protocol solves this problem with secret key cryptography. Instead
of sharing a password, communication partners share a cryptographic key, and they use
knowledge of this key to verify one another's identity. In order for the technique to work,
the shared key must be symmetric — that is, a single key must be capable of both
encryption and decryption. One party proves knowledge of the key by encrypting a piece
of information; the other proves knowledge of the key by decrypting the information.
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Kerberos authentication relies on several keys and key types for encryption. Key
types can include long-term symmetric keys, long-term asymmetric keys, and short-term
symmetric keys. The authentication protocol was designed to use symmetric encryption,
meaning that the same shared key is used by the sender and the recipient for encryption
and decryption.
3.3.1 Long Term Symmetric Keys
-

The long-term symmetric keys are derived from a password. The plaintext
password is transformed into a cryptographic key by passing the text of the password
through a cryptographic function. The result of the cryptographic function is the key.
User keys -When a user is created, the password is used to create the user key. In
the KDC domain, the user key is stored with the user's object in the KDC. At the
workstation, the user key is created when the user logs on.
System keys When a workstation or a server joins a Kerberos domain, it receives
-

a password. In the same manner as a user account, the system account's password is used
to create the system key.
Service keys Services use a key based on the account password they use to log
-

on. All KDC's in the same realm use the same service key.
Here a new term has been introduced and we need to define it.
Realm Each principal is a member of a realm. By convention, a realm name is
-

the DNS name converted to uppercase, so that the kerbtest.njit.edu domain becomes the
KERBTEST.NJIT.EDU realm. Although uppercase realms are not obligatory, using a
different case simplifies differentiating between domain names and realms. So essentially
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realm is just a domain or an area in which everybody trusts the KDC and has an account
with it. As of now this definition will suffice will discuss more when we move to Inter
realm communication and transitive trust relationships.

3.3.2. Kerberos Ticket's
The main component of Kerberos authentication is the ticket. The Kerberos messages are
used to request and deliver tickets. There are two types of tickets used in Kerberos
authentication, TGTs and service tickets.
Kerberos Ticket Requests
The Kerberos client sends the following ticket requests to the KDC:
TGT — Authentication Service
Service Ticket — Ticket-granting Service

Ticket Granting Ticket's
-

The KDC responds to a client's authentication service request by returning a service ticket
for itself. This special service ticket is called a ticket-granting ticket (TGT). A TGT
enables the authentication service to safely transport the requester's credentials to the
ticket-granting service.
A TGT is:
•

A user's initial ticket from the authentication service

•

Used to request service tickets

•

Meant only for use by the ticket-granting service
TGTs are encrypted with a key shared by the KDC's. The client cannot read

tickets. Only KDC server's can read TGTs to secure access to user credentials, session
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keys, and other information. Like an ordinary service ticket, a TGT contains a copy of the
session key that the service (in this case the KDC) will use in communicating with the
client. The TGT is encrypted with the KDC's long-term key.
From the client's point of view, a TGT is just another ticket. Before it attempts to
connect to any service, the client first checks its credentials cache for a service ticket to
that service. If it does not have one, it checks the cache again for a TGT. If it finds a TGT,
the client fetches the corresponding TGS session key from the cache, uses this key to
prepare an authenticator (described later in this document), and sends both the
authenticator and the TGT to the KDC, along with a request for a service ticket for the
service. In other words, gaining admission to the KDC is no different from gaining
admission to any other service in the domain — it requires a session key, an authenticator,
and a ticket.
From the KDC's point of view, TGTs enable it to avoid the performance penalties
of looking up a user's long term key every time the user requests a service. The KDC
looks up the user's long-term key only once, when it grants an initial TGT. For all other
exchanges with this client, the KDC can decrypt the TGT with its own long-term key,
extract the session key, and use that to validate the client's authenticator.

Service tickets
A service ticket enables the ticket-granting service (TGS) to safely transport the
requester's credentials to the target server or service. The KDC responds to the client's
request to connect to a service by sending both copies of the session key to the client. The
client's copy of the session key is encrypted with the key that the KDC shares with the
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client. The service's copy of the session key is embedded, along with information about
the client, in a data structure called a service ticket. The entire structure is then encrypted
with the key that the KDC shares with the service. The ticket — with the service's copy of
the session key safely inside — becomes the client's responsibility to manage until it
contacts the service.
A service ticket is used to authenticate with services other than the TGS and is
meant only for the target service. A service ticket is encrypted with a service key, which is
a long-term key shared by the KDC and the target service. Thus, although the client
manages the service ticket, the client cannot read it. Only the KDC and the target service
can read tickets, enabling secure access to user credentials, the session key, and other
information. One thing to note over here is that the KDC is simply providing a
ticket-granting service. It does not keep track of its messages to make sure they reach the
intended address. No harm will be done if the KDC's messages fall into the wrong hands.
Only someone who knows the client's secret key can decrypt the client's copy of the
session key. Only someone who knows the server's secret key can read what is inside the
ticket.
When the client receives the KDC's reply, it extracts the ticket and the client's
copy of the session key, putting both aside in a secure cache (located in volatile memory,
not on disk). When the client wants admission to the server, it sends the server a message
that consists of the ticket, which is still encrypted with the server's secret key, and an
authenticator, which is encrypted with the session key. The ticket and authenticator
together are the client's credentials to the server.
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Benefits of service tickets
The server does not have to store the session key that it uses in communicating with
client's. It is the client's responsibility to hold a ticket for the server in its credentials
cache and present the ticket each time it wants access to the server. Whenever the server
receives a service ticket from a client, the server can use its secret key to decrypt the ticket
and extract the session key. When the server no longer needs the session key, it can
discard it. The client does not need to go back to the KDC each time it wants access to
this particular server. Service tickets can be reused. To guard against the possibility that
someone might steal a copy of a ticket, service tickets have an expiration time that is
specified by the KDC in the ticket's data structure.
Information client's have about tickets
A client needs to have some information about what is inside tickets and TGTs in order to
manage its credentials cache. When the KDC returns a ticket and session key as the result
of an authentication service (AS) or ticket-granting service (TGS) exchange, it packages
the client's copy of the session key in a data structure that includes the information in the
following ticket fields: Authentication Time, Start Time, End Time, and Renew Till. The
main information within a Kerberos Ticket is summarized in the table below.
In the above diagram we see that client 1 's network diagram is four octet long.
The field is fixed length. Kerberos was designed to run in the network using TCP/IP
protocol suite. This fixed length field means that this version of Kerberos cannot be used
in a network with longer addresses. Ticket life time units are 5 minutes. So the maximum
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ticket lifetime is a little over 21 hours. Time stamp tells you the time the ticket was
created.

Table 3.1 Kerberos Ticket Components

3.4 Kerberos Operation
The basic Kerberos authentication steps are:
•

A client authenticates itself to the KDC by sending the pre authentication data.

•

KDC sends the TGT which can be used by the client to authenticate itself in the
following transactions.

23

•

A client sends a request to the authentication server (AS) for "credentials" for a
given server.

•

The AS responds with these credentials, encrypted in the client's key. The
credentials consist of a "ticket" for the server and a temporary encryption key or
a "session key".

•

The client transmits the ticket (which contains the client's identity and a copy of
the session key, all encrypted in the server's key) to the server.

•

The session key (now shared by the client and server) is used to authenticate the
client and may optionally be used to authenticate the server. It may also be used
to encrypt further communication between the two parties or to exchange a
separate sub-session key to be used to encrypt further communication.

3.4.1 Kerberos Message Exchange
The Basic Kerberos exchange is divided into 3 parts:
Authentication Server (AS) exchange
Ticket Granting Server (TGT) exchange
Client/ Server Exchange
3.4.2 Authentication Server (AS) Exchange
The various messages in this exchange are:
Kerberos authentication service request (KRB_AS_REQ)
The client contacts the Key Distribution Center's authentication service for a
short-lived ticket (a message containing the client's identity SIDs) called a ticket-granting
ticket (TGT). This happens at logon.
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Figure 3.4 Kerberos authentication service
The Kerberos client on the workstation sends the message KRB_AS_REQ to the
KDC. The message includes:
•

The user principal name

•

The name of the account domain

•

Pre-authentication data encrypted with the user's key derived from the user's
password
The KDC gets its copy of the user key from the user's record in its account

database. When it receives a request from the Kerberos client on the user's workstation,
the KDC searches its database for the user, pulls up the account record, and takes the user
key from a field in the record.
This process — computing one copy of the key from a password, fetching another
copy of the key from a database — actually takes place only once, when a user initially
logs on to the network. Immediately after accepting the user's password and deriving the
user's long-term key, the Kerberos client on the workstation requests a service ticket and
TGS session key that it can use in subsequent transactions with the KDC during this logon
session.
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To verify the user during the complete login session the KDC decrypts the
pre-authentication data and evaluates the timestamp inside. If the timestamp passes the
test, the KDC can be assured that the pre-authentication data was encrypted with the user
key and thus verify that the user is genuine. After it has verified the user's identity, the
KDC creates credentials that the Kerberos client on the workstation can present to the
ticket-granting service.
Kerberos authentication service response (KRB_AS_REP)
The authentication service (AS) constructs the TGT and creates a session key the
client can use to encrypt communication with the ticket-granting service (TGS). The TGT
has a limited lifetime. At the point that the client has received the TGT, the client has not
been granted access to any resources, even to resources on the local computer.
The KDC replies with KRB_AS_REP containing a service ticket for itself. This
special service ticket is called a ticket-granting ticket (TGT). Like an ordinary service
ticket, a TGT contains a copy of the session key that the service (in this case the KDC)
will use in communicating with the user. The message that returns the TGT to the user
also includes a copy of the session key that the user can use in communicating with the
KDC. The TGT is encrypted in the KDC's long-term key. The user's copy of the session
key is encrypted in the user's long-term key.
The message includes:
•

A TGS session key for the user to use with the TGS, encrypted with the user key
derived from the user's password.

•

A TGT for the KDC encrypted with the TGS key.
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The TGT includes:
•

A TGS session key for the KDC to use with the user

•

Authorization data for the user
When the client receives the KDC's reply to its initial request, the client uses its

cached copy of the user key to decrypt its copy of the session key. It can then discard the
user key derived from the user's password, for it is no longer needed. In all subsequent
exchanges with the KDC, the client uses the TGS session key. Like any other session key,
this key is temporary, valid only until the TGT expires or the user logs off. For that
reason, the TGS session key is often called a logon session key.
From the client's point of view, a TGT is just another ticket. Before the client
attempts to connect to any service, the client first checks the user credentials cache for a
service ticket to that service. If it does not have one, it checks the cache again for a TGT.
If it finds a TGT, it sends an authenticator and the TGT to the KDC, along with a request
for a service ticket for the service. In other words, gaining admission to the KDC is no
different from gaining admission to any other service in the domain — it requires a
session key, an authenticator, and a ticket (in this case, a TGT).
From the KDC's point of view, TGTs enable the KDC to avoid the performance
penalties of looking up a user's long term key every time the user requests a service. The
KDC looks up the user key only once, when it grants an initial TGT. For all other
exchanges with this user, the KDC can decrypt the TGT with its own long-term key,
extract the logon session key, and use that to validate the user's authenticator.
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3.4.3 The Ticket-Granting Service Exchange
The various messages here are
Kerberos ticket granting service request (KRB_TGS_REQ)
-

The client wants access to local and network resources. To gain access, the client
sends a request to the TGS for a ticket for the local computer or some network server or
service. This ticket is referred to as the service ticket or service ticket. To get the ticket,
the client presents the TGT, an authenticator, and the name of the target server.

Figure 3.5 Kerberos ticket-granting service

The message includes:
The name of the target computer
The name of the target computer's domain
The user's TGT
An authenticator encrypted with the session key the user shares with the KDC
Kerberos ticket granting service response (KRB_TGS_REP)
-

The TGS examines the TGT and the authenticator. If these are acceptable, the
TGS creates a service ticket. The client's identity is taken from the TGT and copied to the
service ticket. Then the ticket is sent to the client.
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The KRB_TGS_REP message includes:
•

A session key for the user to share with the computer encrypted with the session
key the user shares with the KDC.

•

The user's service ticket to the computer, encrypted with the computer's secret
key.
The service ticket includes:

•

A session key for the computer to share with the user

•

Authorization data copied from the user's TGT

3.4.4 The Client/Server Exchange:
Kerberos application server request (KRB_AP_REQ)
After the client has the service ticket, the client sends the ticket and a new
authenticator to the target server, requesting access. The server will decrypt the ticket and
validate the authenticator.

Figure 3.6 Kerberos application server

This message contains:
•

An application option flag indicating whether to use session key An application
option flag indicating whether the client wants mutual authentication
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•

The service ticket obtained in the TGS exchange

•

An authenticator encrypted with the session key for the service

Kerberos application server response (KRB_AP_REP)
Optionally, the client might request that the target server verify its own identity.
This is called mutual authentication. If mutual authentication is requested, the target
server will take the client computer's timestamp from the authenticator, encrypt it with the
session key the TGS provided for client-target server messages, and send it to the client.
If the authenticator passes the test, the service looks for a mutual authentication
flag in the client's request. If the flag is set, the service uses the session key to encrypt the
time from the user's authenticator and returns the result in a Kerberos application reply
(KRB_AP_REP). If the flag is not set, then no response is needed. When the client on the
user's workstation receives KRB_AP_REP, it decrypts the service's authenticator with the
session key it shares with the service and compares the time returned by the service with
the time in the client's original authenticator. If the times match, the client knows that the
service is genuine.
This is the complete flow for a Kerberos exchange in the case of a single realm.
The things become complicated when we move to multiple realms or domains. In this
case the trust needs to be between realms as well. Now in case there a number of realms
between which we may want to communicate and use services we need trust between all
of them and the number of keys increases a lot. We know that the keys are the weakest
link of the whole scenario an ideal solution will be to keep them as minimum as possible.
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In the next section we will look at a scheme called Transitive trust that comes to our
rescue.

3.5 Kerberos Services and Benefits
Kerberos provides various services like authentication, authorization, data integrity and
confidentiality. Moreover there are many benefits of using Kerberos all of this is
discussed below.

3.5.1 Kerberos Services
Authentication
Kerberos provides this using the trusted third party concept. It also provides mutual
authentication by which the server trusts the client as well the client trusts the server. At a
very simple level, Kerberos uses encryption technology. The user's password is utilized
(while still on the user's workstation) to generate an encryption key. The key encrypts
certain pieces of information that are exchanged with the KDC. After a few exchanges,
the KDC returns information to the user that is usable only by software on the workstation
that knows the temporary encryption key derived from the password. Now when users
wish to contact a Kerberos-protected service, they first contact the Kerberos
ticket-granting service and ask for a ticket to the service. A ticket is a chunk of
information that proves the user's identity to the service; but it's encrypted in the services'
long-term key so it's unintelligible to the user.

Authorization
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By default Kerberos does not provide any authorization services, they are usually
implemented as a separate procedure itself. Still authorization information can be
embedded within the TGS. A usual way of doing this in Kerberos is to include Access
Control Lists in the ticket that KDC sends to the client to be sent to the server. Once the
server decrypts the ticket it has a list of services that this particular client can access and
with what privilege level. The server uses these ACL's to authorize the servers future
requests for resources.
Data Integrity
Assuming that the client and service have authenticated each other using the Kerberos
handshake and now each know the key for the current interaction (or session), we have all
the pieces necessary to guarantee either data integrity. Since encryption is a costly
operation in terms of time and CPU power, and we are only looking to ensure that the
data is authentic; we need not encrypt all the data that is transmitted. Instead, an encrypted
one-way hash is computed and transmitted with the plaintext data. Kerberos encrypts the
much-shorter one-way hash, and bundles that together with the "plaintext" data, which is
the original, unmodified message. The sender can then transmit this package to the
receiver, who can look at the package, see what algorithm was used for the one-way hash
and quickly compute the hash. Then the receiver can decrypt the received encrypted
one-way hash and compare it with the hash that was just computed. If the two hashes
match, the receiver knows exactly who sent the message and knows that the message was
transmitted without modification.
Confidentiality
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There are always occasions when it is insufficient merely to know with whom you're
talking and that no one can successfully change the conversation without being detected.
Sometimes, you need to know that the conversation is completely private. A more
technical term for privacy is "data confidentiality" and once again Kerberos addresses this
need. Kerberos provides services that encrypt the entire plaintext message and
(optionally) computes a one-way hash of the ciphertext. The sender transmits the package
to the receiver, who decrypts the ciphertext and (optionally) verifies the authenticity of the
data. Usually if we are encrypting the whole message for Confidentiality we use the Data
integrity feature as well as the cost of computing, and encrypting the one-way hash is
minor compared to the cost of encrypting the whole message.
3.5.2 Kerberos Benefits
Kerberos has a number of advantages as an authentication protocol. This section lists a
number of reasons which act as the main driving points for using Kerberos.
Faster Authentication
Kerberos protocol uses a unique ticketing protocol that provides faster authentication.
Every authenticated domain entity can request tickets from its local Kerberos KDC to
access other domain resources. The tickets are considered as access permits by the
resource servers. The ticket can be used more then once and can be cached on the client
side
The use of tickets makes the re-authentication of the client much easier. Once a
client has a Ticket from the KDC it can be used again and again for authentication.
Mutual Authentication
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Kerberos supports Mutual authentication by which not only client authenticates itself to
the server but the server can also authenticate to the client. So there is no assumption
made that the servers are always trustworthy.
Open Source
Kerberos is an Open Source protocol so essentially free to use. Because of being open
source there is also much faster development done on all the fronts and it is being used
and tested by a much larger user base.
Support for authentication Delegation
What delegation really means is that user A can give rights to an intermediary machine B
to authenticate to an application server C as if machine B was user A. This means that
application server C will base its authorization decisions on user A's identity rather than
on machine B's account. Delegation is also known as authentication forwarding. In
Kerberos terminology this basically means that user A forwards a ticket to intermediary
machine B, and that machine B then uses user A's ticket to authenticate to application
server C. You can use delegation for authentication in multi tier applications; an example
of such an application is database access using a Web front end. In such a setup the
browser, the Web server, and the database server are all running on different machines. In
a multi tier application, authentication happens on different tiers. In such application if
you want to set authorization on the database using the user's identity, you should be
capable of using the user's identity for authentication both on the web server and the
database server.
Support for Public Key Cryptography and One time pass codes
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Kerberos supports use of Public Key Cryptography for authentication of the client to the
KDC, this way the password guessing/stealing attacks can be minimized. Another
solution that Kerberos provides for such issues is to use One Time Passcodes or Smart
cards in which each time to authenticate the user uses a different password so a password
guessing mechanism or a Trojan horse program will never work as the password changes
at each login.

3.6 Limitations
This section introduces the limitations of the Kerberos.
Denial of Service attacks
Denial of Service attacks can occur in Kerberos, in which case the authentication service
provided by the KDC can be denied to the clients and servers. The actual reasons for the
DoS are beyond the scope of this paper as they deal with the actual Kerberos code and
buffers used in it. Most of the DoS attacks are possible by buffer overflowing attacks on
the KDC. Though this does not lead to any compromises of security of the clients and
KDC but still can lead to significant damage because of the lost time for which no one is
able to use the KDC.
Password Guessing
Password guessing attacks are not solved by Kerberos. In case the user chooses a poor
password, it can be decrypted by an attacker using an offline dictionary attack. In order to
mount an offline dictionary or brute force attack, some data that can be used to verify the
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user's password is needed. One way to obtain this from Kerberos 5 is to capture a login
exchange by sniffing network traffic.
In Kerberos 5 a login request contains preauthentication data that is used by
Kerberos to verify the user's credentials when a TGT is issued. The basic
preauthentication scheme in most of the Kerberos implementations contains an encrypted
timestamp and a cryptographic checksum, both using a key derived from the user's
password. The timestamp in the preauthentication data is ASCII-encoded prior to
encryption and is of the form YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ. This provides structured plain
text that can be used to verify a password attempt: if the decryption result "looks like" a
timestamp, then the password attempt is almost certainly correct. A password attempt that
recovers a plausible timestamp can also be verified by computing the cryptographic
checksum and comparing it to the one in the preauthentication data.
Time synchronization
Each host on the Kerberos network needs to have its clock "loosely synchronized" to the
KDC. This helps in reducing the book keeping overhead on the application servers, to do
replay detection. The degree of looseness can be configured on a per server basis and is
usually of the order of 5 minutes. This clock synchronization in itself needs to be secured
because an attack on this can lead to DoS for the valid clients.
Principal Identifier Recycling
The principal identifiers which identify a particular client or a server on the Kerberos
network can be re used once deleted. The issue here is that in case the same principal
name had some ACL's (Access Control Lists) associated with it which was not deleted
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when the principal was deleted, then the new principal will inherit this ACL and will in
advertently gain access to resources.
These were the main limitations that Kerberos has of on now and but all the limitations
and Vulnerabilities have workarounds. So a carefully designed Kerberos system can
provide perfect security in a network environment.

CHAPTER 4
SIM-BASED KERBEROS

The open nature of university networks and the large amount of personal information they
store make them prime targets for identity theft and other information security threats.
Unfortunately, there are many ways for hackers to steal and misuse passwords. Our
primary SmartCampus authentication uses Kerberos, which is based on Username and
Password. Kerberos has the primary strengths and weakness of itself: Kerberos provides a
means of verifying the identities of principals on an open network. This is accomplished
without relying on authentication by the host operating system, without basing trust in the
host addresses, without requiring physical security of all the hosts on the network and
under the assumption that packets traveling along the network can be read, modified and
inserted at will.
The ability of Kerberos to function in an open hardware and network environment
is a unique strength. Kerberos suffers, however, from the same weakness that is
characteristic of all traditional authentication paradigms: the reliable identification of the
human component of the human/machine system. Kerberos requires only a single factor
for user identification: a privately owned password which is used in conjunction with the
user's public name. This password is quite susceptible to compromise and is the weakest
link in an otherwise strong chain.
Two-factor authentication technology — "something you know" and "something
you possess" — can be added to Kerberos Release 5 to provide a level of authentication
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for the human component as secure as is available from Kerberos for the machine
component. Using optional fields in the initial client-to-KDC (the "AS Request")
exchange, adding a pre-authentication flag and linking with appropriate authentication
API are all required.

4.1 Two Factor authentication
-

An authentication factor is a piece of information and process used to authenticate or
verify a person's identity for security purposes. Two-factor authentication is a system
wherein two different methods are used for authentication. Using two factors as opposed
to one delivers a higher level of authentication assurance.
In order to understand two-factor authentication, it is important to understand the
three methods by which people authenticate themselves to digital systems:
There are three universally recognized factors for authenticating individuals:
•

'Something you know', such as a password, or PIN.

•

'Something you have', such as a mobile phone, smart card or security token.

•

'Something you are', such as a fingerprint, DNA, or other biometric.
A system is said to leverage Two-factor authentication when it requires at least

two of the authentication factors mentioned above. This contrasts with traditional
password authentication, which requires only one authentication factor (knowledge of a
password) in order to gain access to a application.
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Common implementations of two-factor authentication use 'something you know'
as one of the two factors, and use either 'something you have' or 'something you are' as the
other factor.
For SmartCampus, we use a SlMcard - the card itself is a physical, "something
you have" item, and the PIN is the "something you know" password that goes with it.
Using more than one factor is also called strong authentication; using just one
factor, for example just a static password, is considered as weak authentication.

4.2 SIM Authentication
A Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card is part of a removable smart card ICC
(Integrated Circuit Card) for mobile cellular telephony devices such as mobile computers
and mobile phones. SIM cards securely store the service-subscriber key (IMSI) used to
identify a GSM subscriber.
4.2.1 SIM Card Components
SIM cards store specific information used to authenticate and identify subscribers
on the Network, the most important of these are International Mobile Subscriber Identity
(IMSI), Integrated Circuit Card ID (ICCID), Ciphering Key Generating Algorithm (A8),
Authentication Algorithm (A3), Encryption Algorithm (A5), Individual Subscriber
Authentication Key (Ki), Encryption Key (Kc).
The secret key Ki is 128 bits long and is used for two things: Generate the secret
response (SRES) to a Random challenge and Generate the 64 bit session key Kc, used for
over the air encryption.
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A3: It is the authentication algorithm used in GSM systems. COMP128 is widely
used by GSM service providers.
A5: This is the encryption algorithm. There are different versions of this algorithm
with A5/1 being the strongest for over the air privacy. A5/x, A5/2 are weaker versions of
this algorithm. There is also another version that uses no encryption at all; it is the A5/0
algorithm.
A8: It is the key generation algorithm. Most of the service providers just like the
A3 algorithm use COMP128.

4.2.2 SIM Authentication Process:
GSM authentication is based on shared cryptographic primitives Ki on SIM and Base
Station. The authentication process is shown below:

Figure 4.1 SIM authentication
During authentication, AC generates a random number that it sends to the
mobile. Both mobile and AC use the random number, in conjunction with subscriber's
secret key and a ciphering algorithm called A3, to generate a number SRES that is sent
back to the AC. If number sent by mobile matches number calculated by AC, then
subscriber is authenticated.
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4.3 SIM Card and Java Card technology
SIM uses operating systems which come in two main types: Native and Java Card. Native
SIMs are based on proprietary, vendor specific software whereas the Java Card SIMs are
based on standards, particularly Java Card, which are a subset of the Java programming
language specifically for embedded devices. Java Card allows the SIM to contain
programs that are hardware-independent and interoperable. I will use the Java Card's
power to build SIM-based security to the Kerberos mobile application.
All Java Cards are essentially smart cards with one extra feature. The Java Card
technology allows different people to use the Java language to develop smart card
applications that are hosted on an individual card. For example, if the SIM card in your
cell phone is a Java Card, it could contain value-added Java Card applications
Also Java Card technology offers an open architecture for smart card application
development. A Java Card contains Java Card Virtual Machine, (JCVM) and a set of APIs
(collectively known as the Java Card API). Some of the classes and interfaces in the Java
Card API are exposed for use by J2ME MIDlets and other client applications.
I will use Java Card technology with J2ME devices, although Java Card
technology is not limited to the J2ME platform. The Security and Trust Services API
(SATSA) enables the use of Java Card technology in J2ME devices. A Java Card
application could work as an authentication module in a J2ME-based SmartCampus
middleware. The SmartCampus middleware would allow users to access their accounts
using their cell phones. The Java Card application on the Java Card would contain the
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authentication logic that ascertains who is trying to access an account. The J2ME device
would contain a MIDlet that would present an easy-to-use GUI for account access.

4.4 SIM Based Kerberos Design and Implementation
-

In most cases, as was discussed before, we could see security breach occurs for either of
Kerberos or SIM authentications. We present a novel authentication solution that protects
user login by providing a double-criterion user authentication through the use of existing
mobile phones. The solution is to combine SIM-Based authentication and Kerberos
authentication to add another layer of security of our Kerberos-based J2ME mobile
application. It overcomes the security inadequacy of the single authentication method and
maximizes the security for mobile users.
4.4.1 Overall Architecture
The architecture is developed in following components:

Figure 4.2 Overall Architecture
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The first part is the SIM Card which we will develop using a Java Card applet
called JavaCardKerberosKey. The JavaCardKerberosKey applet works as a secret key
manager. It contains the Kerberos secret keys Ki, Kc that are used to secure
communication between a J2ME cell phone and the KDC. The secret key generated with
Ki is used to decrypt the encrypted portion of a TGT. The encrypted portion contains the
session key, which an application can only extract using the Kerberos secret key.
Therefore, knowing the secret key is essential for using a TGT.
The second part is a MIDlet running on the phone which is called
KerberosSmartCampus. This MIDIet has three functions. First, it is working as a client to
communicate with the Kerberos Server. Second, it is providing a graphical user interface
to the campus mesh messenger. Third, KerberosSmartCampus MIDlet is also a client of
the JavaCardKerberosKey applet, which means that the KerberosSmartcampus MIDIet
will use the JavaCardKerberosKey applet to decrypt the encrypted portion of the TGT and
extract the session key. The KerberosSmartCampus MIDlet will request a TGT from the
SmartCampus's KDC server. On receipt of the TGT, the KerberosSmartCampus MIDIet
will extract the encrypted portion of the TGT and transfer it to the JavaCardKerberosKey
applet. The KerberosSmartCampus MIDlet will also provide the user's password to the
JavaCardKerberosKey applet. The JavaCardKerberosKey applet will use it with Ki to
decrypt the encrypted portion of the TGT, extract the session key and generate Kc. The
KerberosSmartCampus MIDlet will use the Kc to secure communication with the
SmartCampus server.
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The third part of the application is the Key Distribution Center which will serve as
the authentication server for the mobile client. The implementation of KDC runs on a
physically secure node somewhere in the network and a library of subroutines that are
used by distributed applications which work to authenticate their users. We built it using
Active Directory.
The last one is the Application Server which integrates with SmartCampus
middleware and runs a sample application to demonstrate the user login with the
CampusMesh messenger. We build the middleware using Apache Tomcat with OSGI.

4.4.2 SIM-Kerberos Protocol
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Figure 4.3 Message flows of full-authentication of SIM-Kerberos protocol
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1. The J2ME mobile phone user invokes the KerberosSmartCampus MIDlet in a
J2ME cell phone and provides the username and password to the KerberosSmartCampus
MIDlet. The MIDlet sends a clear-text message along with its identity to the KDC
requesting services on behalf of the user. For Example, "User XYZ would like to request
services". Note: Neither the secret key nor the PIN is sent to the KDC.
2. The KDC checks to see if the user is in its database. If so, the KDC sends back
the TGT to the KerberosSmartCampus MIDlet. It contains following two messages:
Message A: Ticket Granting Ticket: [client, address, validity, Ksess]Ktgs.
Message B: [Ksess]Km
3. When the KerberosSmartCampus MIDlet gets the Kerberos ticket granting
ticket (TGT) from a Kerberos distribution center (KDC), the MIDlet will extract this
encrypted portion from the TGT. The KerberosSmartCampus MIDlet is going to extract
the session key from the encrypted portion. The session key will allow the
KerberosSmartCampus MIDlet to further communicate with the SmartCampus
middleware. The MIDlet will communicate with the SIM card which is implemented by a
JavaCardKerberosKey applet. The KerberosSmartCampus MIDlet will ask SATSA to
select the JavaCardKerberosKey applet. The MIDlet will provide the AID of the
JavaCardKerberosKey applet to SATSA and ask it to create a synchronous connection
with the applet.
4. The MIDlet will pass the UserPIN to the JavaCardKerberosKey applet (the SIM
card) after the connection is established. The SIM in the mobile will use the UserPin and
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existing MobilePin(Ki) to generate the key. The applet performs a one-way function on
the entered key, and this becomes the secret key of the mobile client
5. The JavaCardKerberosKey applet sends the secret key to the MIDlet. Now that
the client has messages A and B and the secret key, it decrypts message A to obtain a key
Kt (Note: The client cannot decrypt the Message B, as it is encrypted using KDC's secret
key.) The key used to encrypt the data on the link, client/KDC session key Kc, is
generated from the Kt and Ki by running the encryption algorithm. This session key Kc is
used for further communications with KDC. At this point, the client has enough
information to authenticate itself to the KDC.
6. When requesting services on the Middleware server, the MIDlet sends the
following two messages to the KDC:
Message C: Ticket Granting Ticket: service, [client, client address, validity,
Ksess]Ktgs.
Message D: Authenticator: [client, timestamp]Kc.
7. Upon receiving messages C and D, the KDC retrieves message B from message
C. It decrypts message B using the KDC secret key, then computes the client/KDC
session key Kc. Using this key, the KDC decrypts message D (Authenticator) and sends
the following two messages to the client:
Message E: Ticket (client, service): service, [client, client address, validity,
Kcs]Ks.
Message F: [Kcs]Kc.

48

8. Upon receiving messages E and F from KDC, the client has enough information
to authenticate itself to the Middleware Server. The client connects to the Middleware
Server and sends the following two messages:
Message E from the previous step: Ticket (client, service): service, [client, client
address, validity, Kcs]Ks.
Message G: a new Authenticator: Authenticator : [client, timestamp]Kcs.
9. The Middleware on the application server decrypts the ticket using its own
secret key and sends the following message to the MIDlet to confirm its true identity and
willingness to serve the MIDlet:
Message H: the timestamp found in client's recent Authenticator plus 1, encrypted
using Kcs.
Finally, the client decrypts the confirmation using the client/server session key and
checks whether the timestamp is correctly updated. If so, then the client can trust the
server and can start issuing service requests to the middleware server. The middleware
will provide the requested services to the client.
To summarize the above steps, the first five authenticate the mobile client to the
KDC. In steps three, four and five, the MIDlet communicates with the SIM card to
generate the client/KDC session key Kc. For steps six and seven, the mobile client
receives a client/server key Ks from KDC to use with the server application. In steps eight
and nine, the mobile client exchanges the key Kc with the server application. After that,
all communications are encrypted with this key.
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4.4.3 Key Generation
The detailed key generation process is shown below:

Ksess

.1

I

Figure 4.4 Key Generation
1. The mobile obtains the IMSI from the SIM card, and passes this with username
to the KDC requesting authentication.
2. The KDC searches its database for the incoming username, IMSI and its
associated password and Ki.
3. The KDC then generates a session key Ksess and encrypts it along with TGT
using the Ki associated with the password.
4. The KDC then sends the Ksess along with the TGT to the Mobile phone, which
passes it to the SIM card. The SIM card decrypts the Ksess with its Ki, password,
producing the encryption key Kc.
5. Kc is used to encrypt all further communications between the Mobile client and
the KDC

CHAPTER 5
LDAP AND AUTHORIZATION

It is important to have the authorization policy after the user has been authenticated by the
SmartCampus middleware. We decided to use LDAP for our authorization scheme not
only for its support for group authorization but also the capacity for directory service.
Smartcampus LDAP directory service is really a database that stores information about all
objects in the network. The mobile directory service is like a phone book for the mobile
network. For example, to find a resource on the network, it will not require remembering
where it is located, but just do a search in directory to find that resource. These resources
include users, groups, activities, and interests, to name a few.

5.1 Introduction to LDAP
LDAP, or "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol", is similar to X.500 in DAP: both
have an information model and a protocol for querying and manipulating it. The major
difference is that the LDAP protocol itself is designed to run directly over the TCP/IP
stack, and it lacks some of the more esoteric DAP protocol functions. The IETF designed
and specified LDAP as a better way to make use of X.500 directories - having found the
original Directory Access Protocol (DAP) too complex for simple internet clients to use.
The common term "LDAP directory" can mislead. No specific type of directory is an
"LDAP directory". One could reasonably use the term to describe any directory accessible
using the LDAP protocol and which can identify objects in the directory with X.500
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identifiers. Directories such as OpenLDAP, though primarily designed as native
repositories optimized for access by LDAP rather than as a gateway to X.500 protocols as
was provided in ISODE, are nevertheless no more "LDAP directories" than any other
directory accessible by the LDAP protocol.
An LDAP directory entry consists of a collection of attributes with a name, called
a distinguished name (DN), which refers to the entry unambiguously. Each of the entry's
attributes has a type and one or more values. The types are typically mnemonic strings,
like "cn" for common name, or "mail" for email address. The values depend on the type,
and most non-binary values in LDAPv3 use UTF-8 string syntax. For example, a mail
attribute might contain the value "user@ example.com ".
LDAP directory entries feature a hierarchical structure that reflects political,
geographic, and/or organizational boundaries. In the original X.500 model, entries
representing countries appear at the top of the tree; below them come entries representing
states or national organizations. Typical LDAP deployments use DNS names for
structuring the top levels of the hierarchy. Further below might appear entries
representing people, organizational units, printers, documents, or just about anything else.
Just as a Database Management System is used to process queries and updates for
a relational database, an LDAP server is used to process queries and updates to an LDAP
information directory. In other words, an LDAP information directory is a type of
database, but it is not a relational database. Unlike databases that are designed for
processing hundreds or thousands of changes per minute, LDAP systems are heavily
optimized for read performance.
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So LDAP is particularly useful for storing information that needs to be read from
many locations, but updated infrequently. For example:
•

The phone book, group chart and related staff

•

Infrastructure services information, including NIS maps, email aliases, and so on

•

Personal Information such as birthday, address, school, hobby and so on

•

Public certificates and security keys

5.2 The Structure of LDAP
The protocol accesses LDAP directories follow the X.500 model:
•

A directory is a tree of directory entries.

•

An entry consists of a set of attributes.

•

An attribute has a name (an attribute type or attribute description) and one or
more values. The attributes are defined in a schema.

•

Each entry has a unique identifier: its Distinguished Name (DN). This consists of
its Relative Distinguished Name (RDN) constructed from some attribute(s) in the
entry, followed by the parent entry's DN. Think of the DN as a full filename and
the RDN as a relative filename in a folder.
LDAP uses schemas to define what attributes an object can and must have. An

entry in our LDAP implementation looks like this when represented in LDAP Data
Interchange Format (LDIF):
dn: cn= Qing Zhu,dc=smartcampus, dc=njit, dc=edu
cn: Qing Zhu
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givenName: Qing
sn: Zhu
telephoneNumber: 973 596 5366
telephoneNumber: 973 596 5366
mail: qz22@njit.edu
advisor: cn=Sotirios Ziavras,dc=smartcampus, dc=njit, dc=edu
objectClass: inetOrgPerson
objectClass: groupPerson
objectClass: person
objectClass: top
do is the name of the entry; it's not an attribute nor part of the entry. "cn=Qing
Zhu" is the entry's RDN, and "dc=smartcampus, dc=njit, dc=edu" is the DN of the parent
entry, where dc denotes Domain Component. The other lines show the attributes in the
entry. Attribute names are typically mnemonic strings, like "cn" for common name, "dc"
for domain component, "mail" for e-mail address and "sn" for surname.
A server holds a subtree starting from a specific entry, e.g. "dc=smartcampus,
dc=njit, dc=edu" and its children. Servers may also hold references to other servers, so an
attempt to access "ou=department,dc=njit,dc=edu" could return a referral or continuation
reference to a server which holds that part of the directory tree. The client can then
contact the other server. Some servers also support chaining, which means the server
contacts the other server and returns the results to the client.

54

LDAP rarely defines any ordering: The server may return the values in an
attribute, the attributes in an entry, and the entries found by a search operation in any
order. This follows from the formal definitions - an entry is defined as a set of attributes,
and an attribute is a set of values, and sets need not be ordered.

5.3 Authorization
LDAP can securely delegate read and modification authority based on your
specific needs using ACL (Access Control List). ACLs can control access depending on
who is asking for the data, what data is being asked for, where the data is stored, and other
aspects of the record being modified. Using LDAP ACLs, we have following functions:
1. Granting users the ability to change their phone number, address and interests,
while restricting them to read-only access for other data types.
2. Granting anyone in the group "Admin" the ability to modify any user's
information for the following fields: title, name, ID number, group name, and
organization name. There would be no write permission to other fields.
3. Denying read access to anyone attempting to query LDAP for a user's password,
while still allowing a user to change his or her own password.
4. Granting Admin read-only permission for phone numbers, while denying this
privilege to anyone else.
5. Granting anyone in the group "Admin" to create, delete, and edit all aspects of
host information stored in LDAP.
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6. Allow people to selectively grant or deny themselves read access to subsets of
the friends contact database. This would, in turn, allow these individuals to download the
friend contact information to their local laptops or to a phone.
7. Allow any group owner to add or remove any entries from groups they own. For
example, this would allow Admin to grant or remove access for people to modify Web
pages. Restrictions can also be based on phone ID or domain name.

CHAPTER 6
PERFORMANCE AND POWER CONSUMPTION

6.1 Evaluation of the phone's specifications.
In order to analyze performance and power consumption, we ran micro benchmarks to
measure the SmartCampus authentication on the phone. The experiments were performed
on Sprint 6700 Pocket PC phone.

Table 6.1 Smart phone Characteristics
CPU Class
MHz
Battery Type
Memory
Operating System

ARM9 CPU
495 MHz
1350 mAh Lithium Ion Polymer
rechargeable
64 MB built-in RAM, 128 MB Flash
ROM
Windows Mobile 5

6.2 Performance measurement using SPB Benchmark on Pocket PC Phone.
Developed by SPB Software House, SPB Benchmark is now the industry standard for
benchmarking PPC Phones. It combines tests of real-world functions such as Internet
access, playing videos, and editing Pocket Word files with tests of the synthetic processor,
memory and graphics, in order to establish a detailed picture of a PPC Phone's
performance.
Our experiments included tests of four of the SPB Benchmark's scores: (1) The
CPU index, which tests processor-heavy functions such as file compression and the
transfer of data to and from memory; (2) The file system index, which reports the speed of
copying and moving 10K and one-megabyte files in RAM; (3) The graphics index, which
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reports the speed that 2D images are displayed on the screen and which has direct
relevance for assessing multimedia performance; and (4) the platform index, which
measures Pocket Word, Pocket Internet Explorer and File Explorer performance. Finally,
the overall index captures the results of all these tests as well as the results of a relatively
simple arcade game test. All the indices are normalized to the speed of a Compaq iPAQ
3650, which gets a 1000 on all scores. In addition to these tests of the phone's processor
performance, we also used the SPB Benchmark to test our PPC Phone's battery life.
Using SPB's typical use test, we set the backlight to 100 percent before taking the
measurements in order to make sure that the results would be consistent with its
performance in a user's daily life.
SPB Benchmark results are in the table below:

Table 6.2 SPB Benchmark Indices
328.94
Spb Benchmark index
1600.38
CPU index
132.25
File system index
2154.11
Graphics index
ActiveSync index
374.77
Platform index
Table 6.3 Main test results
Time
Test
Write 1 MB file
Read 1 MB file
Copy 1 MB file
Write 10 KB x 100 files
Read 10 KB x 100 files
Copy 10 KB x 100 files
Directory list of 2000
files
Internal database read
Graphics test: DDB
BitBlt

1620 ms
266 ms
1851 ms
4644 ms
515 ms
4562 ms
1643 ms
645 ms
4.97 ms

(iPAQ 3650 scored 1000)
(iPAQ 3650 scored 1000)
(iPAQ 3650 scored 1000)
(iPAQ 3650 scored 1000)
(iPAQ 3650 scored 1000)
(iPAQ 3650 scored 1000)

Speed
632 KB/sec
3.76 MB/sec
553 KB/sec
220 KB/sec
1.94 MB/sec
224 KB/sec
1.22 thousands of
files/sec
1552 records/sec
201 frames/sec

% of iPAQ 3650
speed
80%
21%
70%
39%
31%
47%
1%
368%
748%
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Graphics test: DlB
BitBlt
Graphi cs test: GAPI
BitBlt
Poc ketWord document
open
Pocket Internet Explorer
HTML load
Pocket Internet Exp lorer
JPEG load
File Explorer large
fo lder li st
Compress I MB fi le
using ZIP
Decompress 1024x768
JPEG file
Arkaball frames per
second
CPU test: Whetstones
MFLOPS
CPU test: Whetstones
MOPS
CPU test: Whetstones
MWIPS
Memory test: copy I
MB using memcpy

30.5 ms

32.8 fram es/sec

243 %

3.8 1 ms

262 frames/sec

122%

33579
ms
3292 ms

7.76 KB /sec

25 %

7.52 KB/sec

57 %

1889 ms

134 KB/sec

254%

3489 ms

573 fil es/sec

111 %

4989 ms

203 KB /sec

19 1%

582 ms

483 KB /sec

151 %

6.4 ms

156 frame s/sec

144%

5 196 ms

0.072 Mop/sec

155 %

1600 ms

39.4 Mop/sec

115%

10414
ms
10 ms

4.8 Mop/sec

16 1%

99.6 MB/sec

142 %

Figure 6.1 Battery test result
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6.3 Using JBenchmark to test the Java performance
We employed JBenchmark, which is 100% Java-based and is used to evaluate
Java ME-enabled mobile devices, to test the IBM J9 JVM system on the phone.
JBenchmark can be incorporated into the development process and can also be used
independently for testing application performance. JBenchmark has the following
features:
•

Simple and user-friendly

•

Quickly creates benchmark scripts

•

Common Testing Constructs, HttpGet, Random or Weighted choice of tests,
ThreadGroups, and Loops

•

Dynamically generates URLs; randomly sets variables based on a given list of
values or ones from JDBC Source

•

Uses Jelly scripting

•

Various assertions for response status, and response size, ensuring that positive
performance indicators are not the result of page errors

•

Extensible Result Publishers
The table below shows the estimate of Java VM acceleration on the mobile device.
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Table 6.4 JBenchmark Result
Test results
JAR reading
Image loading(PNG)
HTTP specific details
WAP Profile
HTTP User Agent
JVM general
Total Memory
JVM display
Color Display
Double Buffered Screen
Number of Colors
Alpha Levels
Form Size
Canvas Size
Canvas Full Size
GameCanvas Size
GameCanvas Full Size
JVM configuration
ME Configuration
ME Profiles
CLDC Version
Platform
ME Encoding
JVM platform
MIDP Version
MSA version
ME Locale
JVM CDC
Java Installation Directory
Java Class Path
Operating System Name
Operating System Architecture
Operating System Version
List of Paths to Search when Loading
Libraries
Default Temp File Path

148
71

MIDP-2.0 Configuration /CLDC-1.1
1572864
True
True
65536
2
240x268
240x268
240x268
320x320
320x320
CLDC-1.1
MIDP-2.0
1.1
Windows CE 5.1, Pocket PC, PA10A1
CP1252
2.0
No
en-US
J9MIDP20
/My
Documents/temp/N1889033690346Vjar
Windows CE
arm
5.1 build 195
J9MIDP2Obinjtwi_version=No
TEMP
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6.4

Power Consumption

Battery life is extremely important for cell phone performance, especially for those users
who do not have frequent opportunities to re-charge them or to swap in fresh batteries.
For some cell phone users, every minute that can be squeezed from the battery counts.
This section presents the experimental results from tests of the phone's power
consumption, demonstrating that our authentication functionality is highly efficient and
will not affect the daily battery life. Outlined below are the three major steps of the
authentication process:
Step One: The authentication uses a key generation function to calculate the user

key and SmartCampus key.
Step Two: Next, the authentication uses key and encryption algorithms to encrypt

the message, and uses a hash function to make a MAC of the message and append it to the
packet.
Step Three: the authentication exchanges messages with the server via a WiFi

network, decrypting each message in order to securely retrieve the content.
In our experimental methodology, once the encryption is complete, the message
was sent over the network to a server as a Kerberos message. This procedure was repeated
at regular intervals, and the results indicated that the CPU and WiFi are the largest drains
on the power supply. We wanted to know how much current a PDA draws from the
battery, and to have that data in real time.
In order to find out how much power a PDA draws from the battery, we used
acbPowerMeter and acbTaskMan software to display the power consumption values.
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ac bPowerMeter is a freeware applicati on that shows the current consumption numericall y
and graphically, both in rea l time and over the course of a g ive n amount of time.
ac bPowerMeter measures and d ispl ays the total and ave rage current consum ed since the
application started or was las t reset.
For our tes ting pro tocols, I downloaded ac bPowerMeter, installed and started it,
to order to see what wo uld happen when I started a program in the foreground.

In

particul ar, I need to make sure that the wireless tran smi ssio n was enabled on the phone,
and that it was not connected to any power source (including US B-based rec harg ing.)
acbPowerMeter can run in the background without any ri sk o f it interfering with our
ap plicati o n, and causes onl y minimal overhead. After running the appli catio n in questio n
fo r 30 to 40 seconds, I termin ated the program and returned to ac bPowerMeter in order to
evalu ate the results. The o utput shows the Amperage used when the tested appli cati on was
active.
The chart bel ow shows the power consumptio n when o ne authenticati on was done
in fi ve minutes.

o mAL _ _ __

~~~

5 minutes
Now:

330 mA

A\lg: 32 1 rnA
Menu

Total : 12 mAh
' ~'

_

Pause

Figure 6.2 Power Consumption for one authenticati on in fi ve minutes

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH

7.1 Conclusion
Most of today's technology conscious students use mobile computing devices such as
smart phones, laptops and PDAs to carry out their every day activities. Such technologies
and associated applications raise novel and significant challenges in terms of security,
privacy and trust which are of considerable importance to our student population. This
research plan designed and implemented a novel two-factor SIM-Kerberos authentication
and authorization scheme. Such systems provide a fast, lightweight, double secure, cross
platform application for solving trustworthy computing issues including software security,
reliability, mobility, and user privacy. In addition, the analysis showed this fast, less
memory and power consumed security application is ideal for daily use on the
communication restricted and computation restricted mobile equipments.

7.2 Future Research
Future work can be done in authentication and authorization two aspects. First, the
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) protocol can be included in the authentication
scheme to provide an end to end secured wireless communication channel including client,
AP, and server. In other aspect, the Role Based Access Control (RBAC) model can be
involved into the authorization module which will provide a delegate control based on
user's role and even context aware control.
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APPENDIX A
KERBEROS IMPLEMENTATION

The entire core Kerberos fun cti ons are writte n in JA V A Micro Editi on (J2M E). They are
impl eme nted under Connected Limited Device Confi gurati on (CLDC) 1. 1, Mobile
In formati on Device Profil e (MIDP) 2.0 spec ifi cation and run on the IBM J9 JVM on o ur
mobil e pho ne. J2ME provide a good platform to imple ment mobil e applicati o n as well as
Java Ca rd applicaton. J2M E includes some sec urity primiti ves for code s igning and to
Support appli catio n sec urity, but it is no t e nough to support o ur complicated secure key
exc hange. In addition to 12ME, we add Bouncy Castle Library support to implement our
cryptographic APls. Bo uncy Castle provides a smaller footprint for use where resources
are limited and less functio nality is required as well as support to a range of well-known
cryptographic a lgorithm s. For the server side, we use Windows Server 2003 with Acti ve
Directo ry to host the KDC. All users' names, passwords and pho ne number are stored in
KDC - Acti ve Directory. The user interface is shown below:

Usemame
Password
1.....

*******

Message

11000
Send to "'IA=lc::."_ _ _ _ _ _----'

EHlt

"~ g E_

Send

Figure A.I User Interface
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APPENDIX B
LDAP IMPLEMENTATION

We created the LDAP using Active Directory in the computer with windows 2003 Server,
it worked perfectly. We were able to run it without any problems and get the expected
results. The main goal of active directory is to provide directory service and access
control to the clients. For example say in our college environment, and there are students
and teachers. There are certain groups only the teachers can access. So it's the duty of the
active directory to sort out who has the rights and who doesn't. So the active directory
when built using the windows is a perfect match of a purpose.
Active Directory objects store access control permissions in security descriptors.
A security descriptor contains two ACLs used to assign and track security information for
each object: the discretionary access control list (DACL) and the system access control
list (SACL).
DACLs identify the users and groups that are assigned or denied access
permissions on an object. If a DACL does not explicitly identify a user, or any groups that
a user is a member of, the user will be denied access to that object. By default, a DACL is
controlled by the owner of an object or the person who created the object, and it contains
access control entries (ACEs) that determine user access to the object.
SACLs identify the users and groups that you want to audit when they
successfully access or fail to access an object. Auditing is used to monitor events related
to system or network security, to identify security breaches, and to determine the extent
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and locati on of an y da mage . By default. a SACL is controlled by the owner of an object
or the person who c reated the object. A SACL contains access control entries (ACEs) that
determine whether to record a successful or fail ed attempt by a user to access a obj ec t
using a given permiss ion. for exa mple. Full Control and Read.

5ou..

~ .~

_ _ .... _ _ .. _

__ "Y_ ._ _
~

-----~:=---

Figure B.l Acti ve Directory
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